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Follow us on Facebook. Follow us on Instagram. Follow us on Tumblr. Watch us on YouTube. Follow us on Linkedin. You have selected to open If you would like to not see this alert again, please click the "Do not show me this again" check box below. Do not show me this again Cancel Continue. Search DNI. In December , Al Zawahiri pointedly criticized the Palestinian group Hamas for failing to demand "that Palestine have an Islamic constitution before entering any elections.
Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri have based their calls for revolutionary change in Islamic societies on a stated belief in a model of governance where Muslim citizens would empowered to choose and depose their leaders according to Islamic principles and traditions of consultation, or shura.
Al Qaeda military commander Sayf al Adl concluded his May text with advice for Al Zarqawi and other affiliates that includes a detailed strategic framework for the jihadist movement. Elements of similar strategic thinking appeared in statements issued by Al Zawahiri and Al Zarqawi from through A summary follows:. In a July statement, Al Zawahiri outlined "a near-term plan and a long-term plan" for achieving Al Qaeda objectives:.
The near-term plan consists of targeting Crusader-Jewish interests, as everyone who attacks the Muslim Ummah must pay the price, in our country and theirs, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia, and everywhere we are able to strike their interests And the long-term plan is divided into two halves: The first half consists of earnest, diligent work, to change these corrupt and corruptive regimes As for the second half of the long-term plan, it consists of hurrying to the fields of jihad like Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, for jihad preparation and training.
Thus, it is a must to hurry to the fields of jihad for two reasons: The first is to defeat the enemies of the Ummah and repel the Zionist Crusade, and the second is for jihadi preparation and training to prepare for the next stage of the jihad.
The "next stage" remains largely undefined in available statements from Al Qaeda leaders, and efforts to define long term goals are likely to prove divisive in light of evident differences in Iraq and other conflict zones over short term strategy and tactics.
Variations in the intensity and prominence of Al Qaeda leaders' anti-Israeli rhetoric have fueled suggestions that Al Qaeda's commitment to the Palestinian cause waxes and wanes depending on the network's need for support—becoming more pronounced during periods when Al Qaeda's actions have alienated supporters or as part of a more outright ideological appeal. Bin Laden has addressed these charges personally and argued that support for the Palestinians and all Muslims is and will remain essential to Al Qaeda's cause, which is the mobilization of the entire Muslim world in resistance to perceived U.
Other Al Qaeda figures have alluded to the desirability of attacks on and eventual conflict with Israel. In January , Al Zarqawi claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on northern Israel, which he claimed was personally ordered by Osama Bin Laden. He described the attack as "the beginning of a blessed action to strike the Zionist enemy at the heart of its existence. Al Qaeda leaders' statements reveal sophisticated consideration of the economic and military vulnerabilities of the United States and its allies, particularly with regard to the role of Middle Eastern oil as "the basis of industry" in the global economy.
In an interview reportedly conducted on or around the fourth anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Al Zawahiri urged "mujahidin to concentrate their campaigns on the Muslims' stolen oil" and to "not allow the thieves ruling [Muslim] countries to control this oil.
Statements by Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri urging attacks on oil infrastructure and military supply lines could indicate a shift in Al Qaeda's strategic and tactical planning in favor of a more protracted attritional conflict characterized by disruptive attacks on economic and critical energy production infrastructure. A string of attempted attacks on oil production facilities in Saudi Arabia and Yemen since early have been heralded by some jihadist media outlets as operations conforming to Al Qaeda leaders' calls for economic warfare against the United States and its regional allies.
The Saudi Arabian government has sought to discredit Al Qaeda affiliates by portraying their attempted attacks on oil facilities as a threat to the economic lifeblood of the Saudi population. Statements from Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, the late Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, Sayf al Adl, and Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq display the uncompromising commitment of Al Qaeda's leaders and operational affiliates to a consistent ideological agenda focused on two sequential goals: the expulsion of foreign forces and influences from Islamic societies and, ultimately, the creation of an Islamic state ruled by sharia law.
The political prescriptions outlined in the statements are rooted in the Islamic principle known as tawhid , or the principle of the absolute unity of God, and an identification of Islam as an all-encompassing religious, political, and social system. Throughout their statements, Al Qaeda founders and affiliates characterize as "infidels" those who do not share these beliefs, those who oppose the creation of an Islamic state on the terms they describe, and those supporting existing governments and coalition activities in the Islamic world.
Al Qaeda's diverse statements contain calculated variations in tone and content that address or appeal to various target audiences. In his early statements, for example, Osama Bin Laden adopted a pseudo-nationalist tone in directly addressing the population of Saudi Arabia and outlining ways that specific groups in Saudi society could support Al Qaeda.
In his and statements addressed to the U. Bin Laden's earlier statements also addressed the American public in several instances that he since has characterized as attempts to explain his motives and outline steps the United States should have taken in order to avoid Al Qaeda attacks. Over time, the cornerstone of Al Qaeda leaders' religious and political rhetoric has remained consistent: Muslims should view themselves as a single nation and unite to resist anti-Islamic aggression on the basis of obligatory defensive jihad.
Non-Islamic government is unacceptable, and Muslims should join Al Qaeda and other sympathetic groups and movements in opposing those seeking to establish secular democratic governments or maintain existing governments deemed to be insufficiently Islamic. Bin Laden has often coupled his "Islamic-unity" rhetoric with litanies of anti-Semitic statements, condemnations of Israel, and allegations of U. Following September 11, , Bin Laden has appealed directly to national groups on the front lines of robust counter-terrorism operations, particularly the populations of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories.
Although Bin Laden's ideological rhetoric has remained relatively consistent, he and other Al Qaeda leaders have placed varying levels of emphasis on specific strategic objectives and tactics in their statements over the years.
In statements addressed to U. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda's operational record seems to indicate that its leaders' commitment to specific national causes and limited political objectives are rhetorical tools designed to elicit support for their broader ideological agenda of confrontation with the West and puritanical reform in the Islamic world. For example, Bin Laden's rhetorical treatment of the presence of U. In messages to regional audiences, Bin Laden and his deputies have characterized U.
In his December statements, Bin Laden referred to the confrontation between the U. From a strategic perspective, statements from Al Zawahiri and others advocate for a phased struggle, in which the first goal is the expulsion of U.
Overall, Al Qaeda leaders have displayed a pragmatic willingness to adapt the strategic and tactical content of their statements to changing circumstances while retaining a messianic commitment to their broader ideological agenda. Although Bin Laden's self-professed goal is to "move, incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation" 58 until it reaches a revolutionary "ignition point," 59 Al Qaeda leaders' statements and Al Qaeda's attacks largely have failed to effectively mobilize widespread Muslim support for their agenda thus far.
Since late , however, public opinion polling and media monitoring in the Middle East and broader Islamic world indicate that dissatisfaction with the United States and its foreign policy has grown significantly within many Muslim societies. In light of this trend, Al Qaeda leaders' shift toward more explicitly political and ideological rhetoric seems to signal a direct attempt to broaden the movement's appeal, solicit greater financial and material support, and possibly inspire new and more systematically devastating attacks.
Some experts have argued however, that the uncompromising, anti-democratic tone of some public statements by Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri may alienate Muslims who oppose theocracy or who support secular or representative government.
The anti-Shiite sectarian rhetoric of some Al Qaeda affiliates and the persistence of terrorist attacks that kill and maim Sunni and Shiite Muslims in Iraq also undermine Al Qaeda's appeal among some groups. Experience suggests that Al Qaeda's leaders believe that regular attempts to characterize Al Qaeda's actions as defensive and religiously sanctioned will increase tolerance of and support for their broader ideological program.
The identification of limited political objectives and the implication that their fulfilment will resolve broader grievances may generate broader appeal than the group's underlying ideological agenda.
Osama Bin Laden's truce proposals addressed to citizens of the United States and its European allies illustrate this trend, but the proposals' validity has been questioned due to ongoing attacks and continuing threats. Overall, Al Qaeda leaders' statements from the mids through the present indicate that they continue to see themselves and their followers as the vanguard of an international Islamic movement primarily committed to ending U.
Public statements addressed to regional and international populations will likely continue to play a prominent role in Al Qaeda's efforts to achieve its goals.
The statement above can be evaluated by looking at the concrete impacts of the terrorist attacks. Note, therefore, that significant damage was caused, but that the correlation of forces between the U. Besides, the statement cited above can also be evaluated through the prism of al-Qaeda's finances.
Most of their resources are directed to carrying out terrorist attacks 14 14 According to data assembled by Byman a, p. The cost of the attacks on the London metro were somewhere around 8, GBP. With relation to revenue, al-Qaeda seeks to not restrict itself to just one sponsor country. As a result, al-Qaeda had to diversify its sources of income. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.
Accessed on January 28, Despite these diverse sources of financing, this total would not sustain a direct confrontation with the U. We therefore have more important evidence that the link between the acts and al-Qaeda's political objective is indirect, which allows us to categorize al-Qaeda as a terrorist group in the terms we have proposed here. Zarqawi even went to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets, but returned to Jordan at the end of the conflict, ending up participating in groups opposed to the government.
However, he was arrested in after batches of explosives were found in his possession. After leaving prison in , Zarqawi returned to Afghanistan, seeking the support of bin Laden in order to build his organization. Furthermore, bin Laden and Zawahiri disagreed with the extremist views of Zarqawi, particularly with his emphasis on attacking Shiites, who the Jordanian accused of betrayal.
Despite their differences, both groups managed to work together, above all because of the fact that Zarqawi operated in the Levant — a region that spans from Jordan to Syria — where al-Qaeda was fragile. The U. Chosen by then-President George W. Bush to command the provisional authority of Iraq, Paul Bremer took two decisions that contributed to increasing the destabilization of the country.
In , taking advantage of this situation, Zarqawi swore loyalty to bin Laden, giving birth to al-Qaeda in Iraq. This association brought benefits for both groups.
Despite these gains, the relationship continued to be permeated with divergences because bin Laden and Zawahiri were pressing for terrorist attacks focused on U. After the death of Zarqawi in June and a series of attacks on al-Qaeda in Iraq when Sunni tribes allied with the U.
Bin Laden and Zawahiri looked to intervene, advising the remnants to discard the objectives and tactics designed by Zarqawi and to seek the support of the local population. The decision taken, however, went contrary to that advice. Shortly before his death, Zarqawi had founded a council composed of various jihadist groups acting in Iraq because he recognized that it made no sense for al-Qaeda in Iraq to compete with them.
This council then announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq, leading Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, Zarqawi's successor, to swear loyalty to this new body, which was led by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. However, in , the Islamic State of Iraq seemed to have its days numbered. Two events, however, ended up helping the Islamic State of Iraq survive. First, after the withdrawal of U.
Such a stance galvanized Sunni resistance, throwing it into the arms of extremist movements acting in the country, especially the Islamic State of Iraq. The second event was the emergence of the civil war in Syria in If the sectarianism between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq was of the utmost importance in allowing for the regrouping of the Islamic State of Iraq, the Syrian context allowed al-Baghdadi to expand his operation radius.
The border between Syria and Iraq had always been porous, which allowed jihadists to penetrate Iraqi territory. Jihadist groups now returned to Syrian territory and destabilized the country even more.
The Islamic State of Iraq took advantage of this situation and entered the conflict, especially through the Jabat al-Nursa organization, which was formed in January Finally, on July 04, , after taking large portions of Syrian and Iraqi territories, Baghdadi declared the formation of a new caliphate, occupying the position of caliph himself.
Like Al-Qaeda, the origin contexts cited above point to the relevance that U. Likewise, the status quo that it so longed to alter was also one of asymmetry between Muslim countries and the West.
The difference, as one will see, rests in the justifications for the goals sought by ISIS, as with the means of action, which will be explored in the next section. In ideological terms, however, the biggest difference between the groups was perhaps the apocalyptic bias of ISIS.
It deals with a process of purifying Islam, to the degree that some chosen ones will determine who should be extirpated from the political community, as well as those from outside it who threaten that same community. Furthermore, Baghdadi, in addition to having a degree in Islamic studies from the University of Baghdad and having worked as an Imam in Baghdad and Fallujah, considers himself to be a direct descendant of the prophet Muhammad, which would legitimize even more his interpretation of Muslim teachings.
This vision of the world presents relevant implications, above all about the definition of enemies of the caliphate. Among its list of antagonists, ISIS believes that it must begin to eliminate those who are closest, such as the Shiites and Kurds, for example. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil. All told, the political objective of ISIS is also the reversal of the situation of the Muslim world's submission. However, in contrast to al-Qaeda, such a reversal has, as stages, the territorial affirmation of ISIS, which implies the definition of local and regional enemies.
This is to be carried out without overlooking, however, the threat that external actors such as the U. To reach the objectives delineated above, it is possible to argue that ISIS has, roughly, two types of main strategies, each of which is related to one of its tasks. With relation to the territorial consolidation of the caliphate, the strategy used is to build a state while its transnationalization involves other means, among them the terrorist political use of terror.
Both the U. Annual Review of Political Science. Taking this path, it seems to us that the events above allowed for ISIS to undertake a war of conquest on the territories and incite a political revolution in the region. The conquest of a territory the size of the United Kingdom is a more concrete example of this. The second step, however, is understanding which strategies for political stabilization ISIS used. Finally, 'caudillismo' is when the government of a certain country is successively filled by notable figures that can only stabilize it provisionally.
In general, totalitarian regimes stabilize themselves by imposing power bargains between classes, parties, ethnicities, etc. At the same time, they incorporate old structures of power with a new political apparatus, interested above all in a continuous ideological transformation.
Such an institutional design has as a goal not only the control of the areas it has seized, but also that of minimizing the impact that the occasional death of one of its leaders could have on the functioning of the organization.
In addition to political bargains with the population for the establishment of a new government structure, another strategy of the foremost importance is the provision of services. ISIS has renovated roads and highways, improvised free community kitchens and looked to guarantee the supply of energy.
These actions are evidence not only of a preoccupation in establishing legitimacy with the populations of the occupied territories, but they also point to efforts to control the territories because, for example, the repair of highways is fundamental for the movement of troops.
However, we cannot forget another facet that has made ISIS become known worldwide: the episodes of abuse and violence perpetrated in its territories. No less revolting are the occurrences of abduction and slavery, targeted primarily against ethnic and religious minorities. These and other examples allow us to state that ISIS's strategy of local control entails the provision of services and the non-terrorist use of terror, that is, that the use of terror is directly linked to the objective of controlling the local population in the present moment.
In: Bringing the state back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Establish a presence in societies marked by sectarian, tribal, ethnic, and political tensions; Accentuate these divisions by making use of calculated terrorist attacks, creating internal conflicts or even external confrontations between potential adversaries with the purpose of undermining morale and strength; When the military control of territories is possible, extract all resources possible in order to finance additional expansion; Use, in a planned way, propaganda to air an image of strength; Inspire local leaders and other organizations to swear loyalty to the caliphate; Indoctrinate recruits with the apocalyptic world view of ISIS; and Inspire lone-wolf attacks, that is, attacks from individuals who are sympathetic to the cause, even if not necessary directly linked to the organization.
One can see more clearly that it is in this sphere of activity that the terrorist political use of terror is employed. Some of the stages highlighted above, primarily the second, fourth, and seventh, make use of terror to try to transform in the future the correlation of forces on behalf of ISIS. Like with the case of al-Qaeda, we can also compare ISIS's complexity through the prism of its finances. I spend a lot of time tracking these movements online and can say that virtually all conversations during the U.
I already seen the creation of at least a dozen new media groups harnessing this celebratory energy to incite for militant jihad. Virtually all militant Islamist factions, not just groups like al Qaeda, have been inspired by the Taliban. When the Taliban seized Afghanistan, HTS injected that story into the morale of its own members and their local cause:. We in the Syrian revolution draw our inspiration, steadfastness, and persistence - after putting our trust in Allah - from these living experiences and examples of adhering to the choice of resistance and jihad, all to achieve freedom and dignity, which is represented in the overthrow of the criminal regime and its allies.
It also motivates us along with our people, to hold to choice of adherence and unity, and the rejection of division, as well as pride in our identity, our civilization, and that to which we belong. Hamas congratulated the Taliban in a statement:. As the Movement wishes the Muslim Afghan people and its leadership success in achieving unity, stability, and prosperity for Afghanistan and its people, it attests that the defeat of the American occupation and its allies proves that the resistance of peoples, foremost of which is our mujahid Palestinian people, will ultimately lead to victory and the achievement of its goals for freedom and return, by the permission of Allah.
Image Credit Site Intelligence Group. Furthermore, the Taliban has proven adept at eliminating the group wherever it has tried to build a footing. ISIS-K will continue to carry out attacks, but it is not a force that can threaten the Taliban in any significant way.
It wants to counter widely held notion among Islamists and jihadists that the Taliban defeated America. It has instead framed the Taliban as an agent of the Americans and its takeover of Afghanistan as part of an American-made plan. What happened is nothing more than replacing a shaven tyrant with a bearded, the former of which failed in the war on terror, while America believes the latter is more useful.
As for the soldiers of the Caliphate, they are preparing for a new stage in their blessed jihad, which will not stop, by the permission of Allah the Almighty, until the entire earth is governed by the rule of its Creator. This is the victory and everything else is but temptations and mirages. For that to happen in any major way, the Taliban would need some degree of normalized travel in and out of the country, though migrants from countries bordering Afghanistan will be able to enter without a problem.
The issue is that the Taliban has essentially given a blueprint to the global jihadist movement.
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